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In the early 1990s Argentina was the darling of international capital markets and viewed 
by many as a model of reform for emerging markets. Early in his Presidency, Carlos 
Menem embarked on a bold set of economic policies, including the adoption of a 
currency board which pegged the peso to the dollar, a sweeping privatization program for 
state-owned enterprises, an overhaul of the banking system, and privatization of the 
public pension system. The business press marveled over the rapid turnaround in the 
Argentine economy. Although there were some concerns about the appropriateness and 
sustainability of the dollar anchor and whether the fiscal reforms were more rhetoric than 
reality, the policies appeared to have conquered inflation and set the country on a course 
of steady economic growth.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, however, Argentina’s situation had dramatically changed. The 
country had weathered the financial crises in Mexico and Asia, and despite the volatility 
of capital flows, Argentina’s currency board remained intact and forecasts of future 
growth were relatively positive. The Russian default in August 1998, however, caused 
international investors to pull out of all emerging markets, seemingly with little regard for 
country-specific economic conditions. More bad luck followed in January 1999 when 
Brazil, Argentina’s major trading partner, devalued its currency, further weakening the 
competitiveness of Argentine exports. Economic growth stalled and unemployment 
remained high. Despite the lowering of world interest rates, which helped reduce the cost 
of external borrowing, the economy was teetering on the brink of default. In 2001, the 
economy spiraled downward and depositors scrambled to pull their savings out of the 
banking system.  In a desperate attempt to stave off disaster, the government imposed 
sweeping capital controls. By 2002, Argentina was in complete political and economic 
collapse. The currency board was abandoned, the exchange rate devalued, and eight years 
of growth in GDP were lost.  
 
Argentina’s situation cannot, however, be solely attributed to a run of “bad luck.” Policy 
decisions taken during the 1990s - and just as importantly policy indecision – made the 
country vulnerable to the kinds of shocks that affected all emerging markets. The 
inability to bring fiscal policy under control, the incomplete reforms of the banking 
sector, and rigidities in the economy, ultimately left the country with no good solutions.  
What the currency board required -- constraints on fiscal policy and complete abdication 
of monetary policy -- proved to be beyond the political capacity of the Argentine 
government.  
 
Much has been written about what happened to Argentina, why the crisis happened when 
it did, and what might have been done to prevent it. Although views differ about the 
relative importance of the various factors leading up to the collapse, there is general 
consensus that peso-dollar convertibility was a two-edged sword – it effectively bought 
the country credibility and eradicated inflation, but at too high a price. Argentina’s 
experience reveals two major problems with currency boards. The first is reflected in the 
relationship between the credibility of the currency board and capital flows. Argentina 
inadvertently entered into a vicious circle with financial markets – one in which it felt 
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regime’s credibility. The Argentine government raised exit costs by issuing its own debt 
in dollars, and by facilitating dollarization in the private sector (for example, by adopting 
prudential norms in the banking system that biased deposits and loans toward dollars 
rather than pesos).  As exit costs mounted, of course, financial markets became 
increasingly concerned about the dire implications of a devaluation, which in turn, 
compelled the government to raise exit costs further. 
 
A second, related issue has to do with the inescapable link between fiscal and monetary 
policy. In retrospect, it now seems clear that the lack of coordination between the fiscal 
policy of the central government and the provinces played a critical role in bringing about 
the failure of the currency board. By 1999, the economy was in a deep recession with low 
growth and high unemployment that required some sort of stimulus –either a loosening of 
monetary policy (i.e. a devaluation) or fiscal stimulus. But either way spelled disaster. A 
devaluation would clearly undermine the currency board. And a rise in government debt 
would raise suspicions that it would eventually be monetized, further undermining the 
value of the peso. Ultimately, fears of a devaluation resulted in more dollarization and 
more of a strain on the banking sector. The added pressure of capital outflow, first from 
international capital markets and then the withdrawal of deposits from the Argentine 
banking system, ultimately tipped the scales. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the major economic events in 
Argentina from the adoption of the convertibility plan in 1991 to the collapse of the 
exchange rate regime in 2001. Section 2 reviews the key components of the 
Convertibility Plan and the responses of financial markets and the macroeconomy to the 
economic and financial reforms embodied in the Plan. Section 3 describes the set of 
external shocks that buffeted the economy between 1991 and 1999. Section 4 reviews the 
set of policy decisions and reforms that took place over that period. Section 5 examines 
the collapse in 2001.  
 
2.  The Convertibility Plan  
 
On July 9, 1989 Carlos Menem assumed the Argentine presidency in the first peaceful 
transfer of power from one democratically elected leader to another since 1928.
1 He 
assumed the office six months ahead of schedule, however, due to the social and 
economic crisis that engulfed the country. The Austral Plan, adopted in May 1985, had 
replaced the peso with a new currency, and prices, wages and utility rates had been 
frozen in an attempt to stabilize inflation.  Figure 1 shows monthly inflation and annual 
real GDP, two key barometers of the health of the Argentine economy over the 1980-
2004 period. The Austral Plan had temporarily slowed inflation but did little to spur 
economic growth. During the period 1981 – 1989, average real GDP growth was negative 
at –0.7 percent and real income in 1989 had slid to 90 percent of its 1980 level.
2 In the 
                                                 
1 For a historical perspective see, della Paolera and Taylor (2001,2002, 2003), Romero and Brennan (2002), 
Randall (1978) and Taylor (1998). 
2 Growth in real GDP based on data from International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
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repressed mobs of angry rioters and looters. 
 
After 18 months in office, the Menem government, under the guidance of Domingo 
Cavallo as Minister of the Economy, implemented far-reaching economic reforms. The 
capstone of the reform package was the Convertibility Plan, which was designed to 
eliminate Argentina’s chronic inflation and restore credibility to the Argentine peso.
3 The 
Plan pegged the peso at a one-to-one parity with the US dollar and required that two-
thirds of the monetary base be backed by international reserves. The other one-third could 
be backed by dollar-denominated Argentine central bank securities at market prices, but 
holdings of those securities could not expand by more than 10 percent per year.
4 The Plan 
effectively converted the central bank into a currency board that could issue domestic 
currency only in exchange for foreign currency at a fixed rate. The government 
encouraged dollarization by making it legal to write contracts in foreign currencies and 
allowing foreign currencies to be used as an alternative means of payment.  By 1994, 
over 60% of time deposits and 50% of loans to the private sector were denominated in 
dollars.  
 
Until the 1990s, trade barriers and restrictions on international investment had insulated 
the country from international markets. Another important component of the plan was the 
reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods and the flow of capital. 
Restrictions on the entry of foreign banks were lifted. The banks faced high reserve 
requirements and to minimize moral hazard, deposit insurance was eliminated. 
Effectively, monetary policy for Argentina was set by the U.S. Federal Reserve, and the 
Argentine central bank had very limited scope to operate as a lender of last resort. The 
implications of this new role for the central bank is discussed in Section 4.b. 
 
The Menem government also proceeded with the privatization of state-owned firms and 
and the deregulation of a number of industries, particularly in the petroleum and gas, 
electricity, and communications sectors. According to a study by Galiani, Gertler, 
Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger (2001), the privatization dramatically increased the 
profitability, sales and efficiency of non-financial as well as financial firms. One of the 
negative consequences of the increase in efficiency, however, was the layoff of   
employees. Galiani et. al. (2001) estimate employment reductions of about 40 percent as 
a result of privatization. One of the positive benefits, and the likely motivator for the 
privatization program, was the revenue accrued by the central government. Some of the 
revenue from privatization was used to finance another of the Menem government’s 
reforms: the transition from a pay-as-you-go social security system to privately-managed 
retirement saving accounts.  
 
An additional benefit of the privatization program was the jumpstart it provided to 
financial markets. Figure 2 shows the value of mergers and acquisitions of Argentine 
companies over the 1990 – 2003 period. In the first M&A boom in 1992, some $8 billion 
in assets changed hands, over 90 percent of which were in the electricity, gas, petroleum 
                                                 
3 See Cavallo and Cottani (1997) and Cavallo (2003). 
4 See Pou (2000) for a detailed description of the Convertibility Plan and the Central Bank Charter. 
  3and telecommunications industries. The second boom occurred in 1997-1999, when a 
much larger fraction of Argentine assets were sold to foreign residents.  
 
The government also took some initial steps toward addressing the fiscal imbalances 
between the provincial and central government. Under the system of fiscal federalism in 
Argentina, the bulk of revenue is raised by the central government, while the provincial 
governments retain a large degree of autonomy in allocating expenditures. Expenditures 
are covered through a complicated system of intergovernmental transfers from the central 
government to the various provinces. Provincial governments also retained some 
authority to issue bonds effectively backed by the central bank. In 1991-92, the Menem 
government was able to lower the transfer payments to the provinces to help cover the 
costs of the pension reform.
5 
 
The market response to the economic reforms was swift and dramatic. Table 1 provides 
summary statistics of Argentina’s macroeconomic performance, government budget 
balance, and its balance of payments. GDP growth picked up in 1991 and continued at 
levels above those of the rest of Latin America through 1994. The currency board was 
effective in taming inflation – the mean level of inflation dropped from nearly 400 
percent per annum to a little under 10 percent in 1991-94 to almost zero in 1995-98. The 
economic boom was fueled by increases in private consumption and investment.   
 
The lifting of controls also had a positive effect on capital inflows and on financial 
markets. The US investment position in Argentine equity rose from virtually nothing in 
the 1980s to around $5 billion by end 1994, roughly 14 percent of Argentine market 
capitalization.  Figure 3 shows the volume and composition of capital inflow into 
Argentina over the 1986-2002 period. The country was effectively in financial autarky 
prior to the Menem reforms, with the exception of sovereign borrowing. That situation 
changed markedly in the 1990s. Capital inflows generally increased in the 1990s, with 
some ups and downs in the 1994-99 period. The cost of capital reflected in the Emerging 
Market Bond Index spread for Argentina hovered between 400 and 600 basis points from 
late 1993 through mid 1994.   
 
The Convertibility Plan was far-reaching in scope and clearly had a positive impact on 
the economy. However, even at the time of its implementation, critics were quick to point 
out that it failed to grapple with some structural problems. First, the Plan failed to 
consolidate the budget constraint for the central government and the provinces. Second, 
there were concerns that the banking reforms were not as deep as they needed to be given 
the lack of a national lender of last resort. Third, labor market rigidities slowed the 
economy’s response to reforms. Fourth, the question remained question of whether 
pegging to the dollar was a feasible long-term anchor for the Argentine economy, 
particularly given that only a small share of Argentine trade was with the US.  And 
finally, the Plan, almost by design, did not specify an exit strategy from the peg, if it were 
found to be unsustainable in the long run. These issues would resurface precisely when 
                                                 
5 See Tommasi (2002) 





3.  External Shocks: Weathering the Storm 1994-1999  
With hindsight it is easy to see that Argentina’s boom in the early 1990s, with inflation 
under control and GDP growth on an upward path, was in fact on precarious footing.  
Like many other Latin American countries, the Argentine savings rate was low, and with 
Argentine government deficits rising, Argentina was especially dependent on foreign 
capital to finance new investments.  Argentina’s vulnerability to shifts in external capital 
flows was first apparent in the aftermath of the Tequila crisis, and became especially 
worrisome by 1999 when Brazil devalued the Real, and foreign capital again abruptly 
stopped flowing. The 1990s saw a number of “star” emerging markets falter, Argentina 
among them.  The ultimate “causes” of the economic crises that shook Mexico in 1994, 
East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999 are still under debate, but what is 
clear is that each of the crises took its toll on Argentina. 
3. a. The Tequila Financial Crises 
 
The start of the so-called Tequila Crisis is typically dated December 20, 1994 when the 
Mexican Central Bank was forced to widen its peso bands in reaction to massive capital 
outflows, leading to an immediate 15% devaluation and further reserve outflows. Two 
days later the peso was officially allowed to float and it continued to lose value while 
peso interest rates sharply increased. The peso depreciations led to concern that the 
Mexican government would default on Tesobonos (short-term government bonds 
denominated in pesos but indexed to the dollar) and Mexican Banks would fail (due to 
the large and growing proportion of non-performing floating interest rate loans).   
 
These fears led to a chaotic exit of foreign and domestic investors from not only from 
Mexico, but from most of Latin America.
7 Figure 4 shows U.S. net purchases of Latin 
American stocks and bonds, as well as net purchases of Argentine securities. Two things 
stand out from the figure. First, US net purchases are highly correlated across Latin 
American countries. Second, U.S. net purchases, which reflect a large fraction of flows to 
this region, are highly volatile and are responsive to financial crises in Latin America as 
well as in other regions. Not surprisingly, Brady bond prices in most Latin American 
countries fell as did stock exchange indices. Figure 5 shows the increase in the EMBI 
spread, which jumped to nearly 2,000 basis points. 
 
                                                 
6 See, among others, Bleaney (2004), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Edwards (2002), Feldstein (2002), 
Gurtner (2004), Hausmann and Velasco (2002). 
7 On February 1, 1995 the IMF approved an external aid package for Mexico (which included $20b from 
U.S., $18b from IMF, $10b from BIS and $2b from commercial banks) which restored investor confidence 
in the Mexican government’s ability to honor the Tesobono contracts. Mexico announced a stringent 
austerity package in early March, and by July re-entered international capital markets and sold $1b in two-
year dollar-denominated notes at 11%, an interest rate well below the 20% plus rates on Tesobonos sold in 
January 1995. 
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Latin America.  The Argentine Merval fell 33% between December 1, 1994 and January 
10, 1995 and Argentine banks experienced significant peso deposit withdrawals and 
substitutions from peso to dollar accounts.
8  Total (peso and dollar) deposits had 
increased dramatically in Argentina between March 1991 and November 1994 as 
Argentines became more confident in the viability of the new economic regime. At the 
end of 1994 the value of peso deposits in Argentina was just 9% lower than the value of 
dollar deposits. During the Tequila crisis total deposits in the Argentine banking system 
fell for the first time since the establishment of the Convertibility Plan, with the decline 
falling disproportionately on peso deposits. After the Tequila crisis, the dollarization of 
deposits steadily increased, so that by 2001 over 80% of time deposits were denominated 
in dollars.
9 A further indication of the impact of the Tequila crisis on the Argentine 
banking system shows up in M3 (currency in pesos and deposits of pesos and dollars) 
growth, which fell by 4.4% in 1995. Peso prime loan rates rose from 10.1 in 1994 to 
17.8% in 1995, and spreads between the peso interest rate and dollar interest rate widened 
by over 50 basis points.  Argentine Central Bank international reserves fell by 18% in the 
first six months of 1995. 
 
The Argentine government responded to the deterioration of its financial markets by 
putting in place a number of banking sector reforms.
10  On December 28, 1994 it reduced 
reserve requirements on dollar deposits in order to provide more liquidity to the banking 
system.  In mid-January reserve requirements on peso deposits were also lowered. A 
special security Fund managed by Banco Nacion (the largest government bank), made up 
of 5 private institutions and 2 public banks and funded with reserve requirements was set 
up to assist institutions which suffered high deposit withdrawals. (Recall that the 
Argentine Central Bank could not serve as a lender of last resort under the convertibility 
law.)  In February 1995 the Trust Fund for Provincial Development was set up to help 
support the Provincial banks, in March a similar Trust Fund for Bank Capitalization was 
established, and changes were made to the Central Bank Charter to allow it to use repos 
and rediscounts to help troubled banks.  In March 1995, Argentina entered into new loan 
agreements with the IMF, the World Bank, and IBD and issued new bonds (for a total of 
$7 billion) to increase international reserves and to fund the trust funds.  In April a 
deposit insurance network was put in place, which covered up to $20,000 per person 
(later raised to $30,000) for certain bank deposits. 
 
In the midst of the after-shocks of the Tequila crisis, President Menem won re-election in 
May 1995 and the run on Argentina’s banks ended.  Argentina’s recovery from 1995 to 
1996 was remarkably swift.  GDP growth rallied from negative 3.6% in 1995 to positive 
5.4% in 1996, led by investment and exports.  However, this new growth did little to 
improve the fiscal situation; the government deficit as a percent of GDP remained stable, 
                                                 
8 See De La Torre, Levy Yeyati and Schumkler (2003) for a detailed description of the reactions of 
Argentine depositors and the banking sector to the Tequila crisis. 
9 Demand deposits remained largely denominated in pesos, while approximately 40% of savings deposits 
were dollarized in the 1990s.  The large increase in deposit dollarization occurred in time deposits, which 
were already 60% dollarized in 1992. 
10 See Dabos and Gomez-Mera (1998) for a detailed description of the post-Tequila crisis banking reforms. 
  6at 1.3% over this period and the ratio of external debt to exports stayed at just under 
340% (see Table 1). 
 
While the Tequila crisis and its implications for capital flows was clearly bad luck for 
Argentina, it was followed by some good luck in the form of US and Brazilian policy 
spillovers.  The Fed shifted toward more expansionary monetary policy in early 1995, 
leading to a fall in US interest rates and a sharp depreciation in the US dollar, in turn 
improving Argentine competitiveness in world markets. At the same time Brazil, 
Argentina’s main trading partner, experienced a rise in the value of the Real, further 
strengthening Argentina’s relative position. These “good” external shocks allowed 
Argentina to recover much more quickly than many had anticipated, and perhaps lulled 
Argentine policy makers and investors into a false sense of security.  Mussa (2002) goes 
so far as to suggest that “were it not for the substantial improvements in bank soundness 
and for the external good luck, the Convertibility Plan might not have survived the 
Tequila crisis” (pp. 21). 
 
3.b The Asia Crisis 
 
There is little evidence of spillover from the Asian Crisis to Latin America until October 
1997 after the attack on the Hong Kong dollar. International bond issues from Latin 
America declined to less than $4b in the 4
th quarter of 1997 compared to $20b during the 
previous quarter.  Figure 4 shows that US net purchases of stocks and bonds in Latin 
America plummeted from a peak of $8 billion in the summer of 1997 to zero in the fourth 
quarter. US net purchases in Argentina, however, remained positive. Stock indices fell 
throughout the emerging markets, with Brazil being the hardest hit, apparently because of 
its large current account deficit and overvalued currency.  At the same time, Argentina 
was considered “doubly vulnerable” because of its fixed exchange rate and its 
dependence on Brazil as a trading partner. Portfolio equity flows to Argentine fell 380% 
and FDI flows fell by 23% between 1997 and 1998, though the net flow of long term debt 
increased by 47%.  Overall, net capital flows to Argentina over this period actually rose 
by 5%, because the sharp decline in portfolio and FDI investment were outweighed by 
the increase in long term debt, which accounted for a larger share of the total. The 
Argentine governments’ only policy reaction to the Asia Crisis was the introduction of 
the “anti-bubble” rule, which increased the capital requirement for new mortgage loans 
when a nationwide real estate price index surpasses certain thresholds. 
 
3.c The Russian Default 
  
Just as emerging markets were beginning to recover from the Asia crisis, news that 
Russia would default on its sovereign bonds in August 1998 sent markets once again 
reeling. Few investors imagined that Russia would not be bailed out, and investors 
quickly realized that if Russia was to default, other vulnerable emerging markets were 
likely to follow. The news from Russia was a disaster for stock market investors in 
Argentina, the Merval plummeted 40% between August and September 1998. Private 
capital inflows to Argentina, which had already slowed in the aftermath of the Asia 
Crisis, now turned negative in the fourth quarter of 1998. From July to August 1998, the 
  7spread on Argentine sovereign bonds almost tripled.  Throughout the fall, the spread 
remained about 400 basis points higher than the spread that prevailed in July 1998 and 
this, in turn, led domestic peso and dollar interest rates to rise sharply.   
 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) suggest that the dramatic stop in international capital 
flows to emerging markets that followed Russia’s partial foreign debt repudiation 
provides strong evidence in favor of contagion-based (and against traditional fiscal-
based) explanations for financial flows.  Countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, which 
had little or no financial or trading ties to Russia found that their access to external capital 
had suddenly been cut off. 
 
3.d Brazilian Devaluation 
 
While Argentina was badly affected by the general exit of investors from emerging 
markets, Brazil - already hard hit by the Asia Crisis - was dealt a knock-out blow.
11 On 
January 13, 1999 Gustavo Franco, the governor of the Brazilian Central Bank, resigned; 
and the government announced a widening of the band for the Real.  This was tantamount 
to a devaluation of the real of 8%.  The financial reaction in Argentina to the Brazilian 
devaluation was immediate. Argentine interest rates rose sharply, the Merval plummeted, 
and Argentina was effectively shut out of global financial markets. 
 
Many observers, at least with hindsight, date the beginning of the Argentine economic 
crisis in 2001 to the Brazilian devaluation (which, in turn, may have been set off by the 
Russia default).  Brazil was Argentina’s major trading partner, and the combination of 
Brazil’s economic woes, which would surely reduce its import demand from Argentina, 
and the exit of international capital flows from the region, had serious implications for 
Argentina.   
 
Returning to Figure 3, we see that that short term lending and portfolio equity flows to 
Argentina, whose trend had generally been rising throughout the 1990s, with short-term 
reversals after the Mexican and Asia crisis, sharply plummeted in 1999.  Total capital 
flows into Argentina remained positive, primarily because of an unprecedented inflow of  
FDI. Interestingly, 64 percent of the inflow of FDI is due to the acquisition of a single 
company, YPF, by Repsol, a Spanish company (see Figure 6). Netting out the YPF 
transaction, capital inflows would have remained positive in 1999, but drop to $5 billion 
from $20 billion.    
 
In a series of papers Guillermo Calvo and various co-authors
12 make the case that severe 
capital flow reversals, such as that experienced by Argentina in 1999-2000, can be 
                                                 
11 While portfolio flows to all emerging market countries fell dramatically after the Russia default, FDI 
flows were less uniform.  Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that FDI flows to Brazil rose substantially in 
dollar terms from mid-1998 to mid-2001. Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) suggest that it was in part 
these FDI flows that allowed Brazil to recover so quickly from the Russia-crisis induced Sudden Stop. 
Other factors in Brazil’s favor were the fact that its’ public debt was only partially dollarized, and that 
substantial fiscal retrenchment was politically feasible. 
12 See, for example, Calvo (1998), Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003), and Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia 
(2004). 
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particular exacerbate an economy’s vulnerability to “Sudden Stops”
13: the pre-“stop” 
level of indebtedness, the degree of domestic liability dollarization, and the dependence 
on financing from abroad to pay for imports.  Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) argue 
that the Argentine economy in the 1990s had just the characteristics that would lead it to 
be hard hit in the advent of a sudden stop.  Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) date 
Argentina’s “Sudden Stop” as starting in May 1999. 
 
The “Sudden Stop” literature suggests that it is the capital flows (or lack thereof) 
themselves that are pivotal.  In theory, a sudden stop in capital flows could arise from 
external factors, such as contagion or margin calls
14 that arise from economic crises that 
are unrelated to the country in question. Internal factors can either mitigate or magnify 
the effects of the sudden stop on the economy.  In countries like Argentina, with a small 
share of tradable goods output relative to domestic absorption of tradeable goods, a 
sudden stop in capital flows requires a sharp increase in the equilibrium real exchange 
rate to transform the current account deficit into a surplus.
15 If the country also has large 
financial currency-denomination mismatches (for example, liability dollarization),
16 the 
real depreciation will, in turn, lead to a weakening of corporate, and in the case of 
Argentina, government balance sheets.
17 
 
Argentina’s experience immediately following the Russian default closely follows the 
Sudden Stop logic.  With the fall off in capital inflows, investors and (perhaps most 
importantly) official creditors realized that the sustainability of Argentina’s fiscal 
situation, though still not dramatically different from where it had been a year previous, 
was precarious.  Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) estimate that “once all the elements 
triggered by the sudden stop are factored in (valuation effects, interest rate increases, 
growth slowdown, and emergence of contingent liabilities from the private sector), the 
                                                 
13 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) define a Sudden Stop as a sharp decline in capital flows that meets the 
following three criteria: (1) it contains at least one observation where the year-on-year fall in capital flows 
lies at least two standard deviations below its sample mean, (2) it ends once the annual change in capital 
flows exceeds one standard deviation below its sample mean, (3) the start is determined by the first time the 
annual change in capital flows falls one standard deviation below the mean. 
14 For a further discussion of the potential role of margin calls in sudden stops see Mendoza and Smith 
(2002). 
15 Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) calculate that Argentina would have needed to depreciate its 
equilibrium real exchange rate by a whopping 46% in 1998 in order to bring down its current account to 
zero. 
16 Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) estimate that Argentina had an extremely high degree of public sector 
debt mismatch in 1998.  Their calculation for Argentina was 0.01 on a 1-to-0 scale with 1 representing a 
perfect match, and zero representing the highest degree of mismatch.  Given this level of currency 
mismatch, the authors indicate that had there been a real depreciation of 46% (the amount needed to 
balance the current account), Argentina would have had a debt/GDP ratio of just under 50% assuming no 
increase in interest rates and no fall in growth rates.  If the contingent liabilities of the public sector that 
arose out of the (also highly dollarized) corporate and banking sectors are included – the debt/GDP ratio 
rises to well over 50%. 
17 Government policy can, in principle, offset the negative effects of a sudden stop induced real 
appreciation on corporate balance sheets by providing the private sector with additional collateral.  Korea, 
with the help of the IMF, was able to mitigate the effects of the Asian crisis induced sudden stop in this 
manner. 
  9primary fiscal balance needed to regain sustainability would have exceeded 3% of GDP” 
in 1998 (page 32). The political economy implications of this for the Menem 
government, which was in its final year (presidental elections were set for December 
1999 and the Argentine constitution did not allow Menem to run for a third term) were 
dire.   
 
3.d Reduction in world interest rates 
 
Argentina looked (at least in hindsight) on the brink of economic collapse in early 1999, 
but just as had been the case after the Tequila crisis, Argentina was dealt a “positive” 
shock in the second half of 1999 that allowed it to make another surprising, even if 
temporary, recovery. 
 
Conditions in European financial markets provided a window of opportunity for 
Argentina, and other emerging markets, to raise capital.  As European governments 
strove to meet the Mastricht criteria in the run-up to the establishment of the Euro, 
interest rates - which had been relatively high in a number of European countries - 
converged downward. This sent investors seeking higher yields to alternative markets.  
Argentina recognized this potential market niche and successfully floated (high yield) 
sovereign debt denominated in euros during this period.  As Mussa (2002) points out, 
“the success of Argentina in floating substantial amounts of sovereign debt in global 
credit markets during much of 1999 and the first half of 2000 testifies both to the special 
conditions in those markets and to Argentine authorities’ particularly deft management of 
public debt.” (pp. 25)   
 
4. Internal Policy Mistakes 
 
At the same time that Argentina was buffeted, in both positive and negative directions, by 
external shocks, internal policies also had a major influence on the economy.  The role of 
fiscal policy in the lead-up to Argentina’s economic collapse is perhaps the most 
controversial.  Mussa (2002) and the IMF (2003, 2004) emphasize the role of failure in 
fiscal policy as the root cause of the crisis.  Others suggest that fiscal policy was either 
less central, or in some views, irrelevant.  Another area of controversy is the role of the  
banking sector in the ultimate collapse of the economy, and in particular the currency 
mismatches between dollar deposits and peso-denominated assets.   
 
4. a Untamed Fiscal Policy 
 
Out of context, Argentina’s fiscal numbers do not suggest much reason for concern.  In 
1993 public debt was 28% of GDP, inflation was under control and GDP growth could 
arguably have been expected to continue at 6-7%.  It was in this seemingly robust fiscal 
environment that the Argentine government decided to privatize its social security 
system, which produced an extra annual bill equal to 1.5% of GDP (roughly $2 billion 
based on GDP in 1995), though in the long run the privatization was expected to save the 
government money. Other privatization efforts in the period 1993-1998 resulted in $2.9b 
in nonrecurring revenues.  By 1998 the Argentine public debt had risen to $112b (as a 
  10ratio to GDP public debt had risen to 37%), which in a broader context might still be 
considered moderate.  
 
Mussa (2002) points out, however, that this rise in public debt should have been 
worrisome because it occurred during a period of relatively high economic growth, it 
included a number of one-off revenue increases due to privatizations, and it would have 
looked worse but for the fact that Brady bond restructuring in 1993 involved substantial 
back-loading of interest payments, and “a good deal of public sector borrowing was not 
included in the budget” (Mussa, pp. 16).
18 An assessment of the Argentine fiscal situation 
is further complicated by the role of provincial government spending, which is not 
subject to a balanced-budget rule.  While provincial deficits generally totaled less than 
12% of GDP per year, the system of Argentine fiscal federalism provided little incentive 
for provinces to reduce spending.
19 
 
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) describe Argentina, which has defaulted on its 
debts five times since 1820, as a “serial defaulter”.  They show that serial defaulters can 
develop debt intolerance, where the risk of default begins to skyrocket at debt levels that 
might be quite manageable for countries with less checkered credit records.  Argentina 
appears, in their calculations, to hit debt intolerance at debt-to-GDP ratios of only 25-
30%, so that alarm bells should have been ringing well before 1998. 
 
It is also worth remembering that Argentina’s public debt during the 1990s was almost 
entirely denominated in foreign currencies, reflecting its limited ability to issue long-term 
debt in its own currency,
20 itself a reflection of the fact that the convertibility regime 
encouraged dollar-denominated debt.
21  A s  w i t h  o t h e r  e m e r ging market economies, 
Argentina could borrow only at sizable spreads over U.S. treasuries, and a negative shift 
in market sentiment generally resulted in higher interest rates, creating potentially 
explosive debt dynamics even at relatively modest levels of debt.
22 
 
At the same time that debt to GDP ratios should have sounded off alarms (and indeed, 
seem not to have sounded off alarms at the IMF until it was too late), Argentina’s debt-
to-exports ratio should have also provided cause for concern. One of the costs of the 
currency board was a chronic over-valuation of the peso.  Figure 7 shows that in the 
                                                 
18 Perry and Servén (2002) show that if an equilibrium real exchange rate (rather than the one-for-one peso-
dollar rate) is used in the calculation, the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio in 2001 rises by 24%. 
19 See Cuevas (2003) for a discussion of reforming intergovernmental transfers. 
20 Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) describe that the difficulty of emerging market economies to 
issue debt in local currency can be traced to one of two (similar though distinct) phenomena: “original sin” 
or “debt intolerance”.  Original sin implies that the problem arises externally, with the structure of global 
portfolios and international financial markets, while debt intolerance implies that the problem arises 
internally, with weak institutions.  In either case, the authors term “currency mismatches” as the 
consequence of these problems.  See also Bordo et al (2003) and Rigobon (2002). 
21 The Argentine government did not issue peso-denominated debt, both because peso debt was more 
expensive (peso interest rates were always higher than dollar interest rates) and to avoid the appearance of 
hedging against the collapse of the Convertibility Plan. 
22 See, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Cespedes et. Al. (2000) and Galiani et. al. 
(2003). 
  11period 1991-1993, the real effective peso exchange rate appreciated by almost 25%.
23 
Between 1996 and 1997 the world price of Argentina’s commodity exports fell by 20%, 
followed by a further decline of equal size in 1998.
24  By the end of 1998 Argentina’s 
debt-to-export ratio was at 379% and debt service payments alone absorbed the majority 
of annual export earnings. In 1999, in the wake of the Brazilian devaluation, export 
growth fell by over 9 percent and the debt-to-export ratio rose to 427%. 
 
Finally, the Convertibility Plan did not stop the Argentine government from attempting to 
monetize its debts.  Once foreign capital had been exhausted, the Argentine government, 
though unable to directly print pesos, did the next best thing by issuing small-
denomination federal bonds redeemable for federal tax payments.  These bonds were 
called “lecop” (for letras de cancelación de obligaciones provinciales) and were 
considered a quasi-money.  Many of the provinces followed the federal government’s 
lead and printed their own versions of quasi-money to pay for fiscal deficits.  For 
example, the province of Buenos Aires issued “Patacón” and Córdoba issued “Lecor”.  In 
December 2001 quasi-monies issued by the federal government and the provinces 
exceeded 24% of pesos in circulation. 
 
4. b  The Role of the Banks  
 
The convertibility regime required an especially strong banking and financial system 
because restrictions on monetary policy prevented the central bank from acting as a 
lender of last resort through money creation.
25 In the aftermath of the Tequila crisis when 
banks experienced massive deposit outflows, the Argentine government put in place a 
number of banking reforms to strengthen domestic banks, and at the same time 
encouraged foreign banking institutions to enter the Argentine market.
26 By the end of the 
1990s, Argentina was considered a model for other emerging market economies in the 
area of banking supervision and prudential policy. Banking system assets doubled from 
only 20 percent of GDP in 1991 to 40 percent of GDP in 1999.  
 
At the same time that the Argentine government was instituting important banking sector 
reforms, it was also saddling its banks (and especially public banks) with public sector 
debt.  Banking system exposure to the public sector rose from about 10% of total assets 
                                                 
23 See Dubas, Lee and Nelson (2004). 
24 Another aspect of Argentina’s trade patterns that increased its vulnerability, was the fact that Mercosur, 
established in 1991 (which created a free-trade zone among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile 
and Bolivia) likely led to trade diversion and a less diversified trade market. Argentina went from trading 
around 20% with Mercosur partners in 1991 to 45% in 1998 (with the bulk of exports going to Brazil). 
25 There was a proviso in the Convertibility Plan Law that allowed up to one-third of international reserves 
to be made up of internationally traded, dollar-denominated Argentine sovereign bonds, valued at market 
prices.  This allowed a very limited “lender of last resort” role since the Central Bank could provide the 
banking system with pesos in exchange for sovereign Argentine bonds (rather than dollars). 
26 Foreign-owned banks presumably contribute to a strengthening of the banking system, because they are 
less tied to the domestic economy (and politics). In 1994 only 15% of total Argentine banking system 
assets were held in foreign banks, this increased to 55% in 1998 and 73% in 2000 (De La Torre, Levy 
Yeyati and Schumkler (2003, pp.50). In the midst of the Argentine crisis, however, foreign banks reacted to 
the increased financial risk by reducing their exposure so that their presence did little to improve the 
situation. 
  12in 1995 to more than 20% by 2001.  In April 2001 alone the government placed $2b of it 
debts with banks in Argentina, at the same time as the Central Bank charter was amended 
in order to allow unlimited lender-of-last-resort liquidity with the backing of government 
securities.
27  The IMF (2003) was concerned by this growing exposure, and writes that in 
the 1990s the Argentine “banking system was vulnerable to three forms of shocks, all of 
which eventually materialized: economic downturn, devaluation of the exchange rate, and 
default by the public sector.” 
 
Under the currency board the Argentine banking system was heavily exposed to a 
devaluation of the peso against the U.S. dollar.
28 While most of banks’ assets and 
liabilities were matched in terms of their currency of denomination, many dollar-
denominated bank loans went to Argentine companies and households that had earnings 
in pesos.  A large devaluation would make re-payment of those loans difficult.
29  
 
Wealthy Argentine residents have long kept bank accounts outside of Argentina in case 
of economic crisis.  It is estimated that Argentines held over $100 billion abroad in the 
1990s, suggesting that they considered the risk of crisis (and presumably expropriation) 
to be substantial. Related to this is the fact that credit from the banking system to the 
private sector, which is generally low in Latin America, was particularly so in Argentina 
where bank loans to the private sector were only 23% of GDP at its peak in 1999.  
 
5. The Unwinding of Reforms 
 
In December 1999, Fernando de la Rua was elected president and inherited a public debt 
in excess of $100 billion. The new government made the decision to tighten fiscal policy 
with a series of tax increases, in the hope that this would further reassure investors and 
help to lower interest rates.  But the tax increases only served to help push a recovering 
economy back into recession.  The country teetered on the edge of default throughout 
2000 but once again another “good” external shock in early 2001 steadied the Argentine 
economy.  U.S. monetary policy loosened, leading to lower U.S. interest rates and a 
weaker dollar.  This in turn resulted in lower spreads on Argentina’s bonds over US 
Treasuries and gave a boost to Argentina’s exports. 
 
The more aggressive fiscal policy also received the endorsement of the IMF. In March 
2000, a three-year SBA for $7.2 billion was agreed to and, in January 2001, this was 
augmented by $13.7 billion. At the same time, additional financing of $39b was arranged 
from official and private sources. In September 2001, the IMF arrangement was further 
                                                 
27 This amendment, ironically put in place by Domingo Cavallo, effectively dismantled the money-issuance 
rule under the Convertibility Plan. Cavallo had hoped that renewing the Central Banks’ ability to serve as a 
lender-of-last-resort would encourage banks to extend credit, but it seemed to have only further weakened 
the credibility of the banking system.  
28 Although it is worth noting that prior to the Corralito dollarization in the banking system was 
concentrated in longer-term bank deposits and loans.  Demand deposits (which were presumably used for 
transactions purposes) were largely denominated in pesos throughout this period. 
29 See De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2003) and Della Paolera and Taylor (2003)  for further discussion of 
the dollarization of the banking system. 
  13augmented by $22 billion, with up to $3 billion to be used in support of a possible debt-
restructuring operation.  
 
However, it was too little and already too late.  Argentines had begun to shift from peso 
to dollar deposits starting in February 2001, and this trend sharply increased during the 
fall, when outright withdrawals of deposits were observed throughout the banking sector.  
De la Torre, Levy Yeyati and Schumkler (2003) document that by November 2001, 47 of 
the top 50 banks had suffered major withdrawals. Between July and November 2001, 
Argentines withdrew over $15 billion from banks -- on November 30, 2001 alone, banks 
saw withdrawals of $1.3 billion.    
 
On December 3
rd, in a desperate effort to prevent further massive capital outflows and to 
halt the run on banks, the government imposed a set of draconian financial controls. The 
Corralito
30 limited withdrawals from bank accounts to 250 pesos per week per account
31 
but depositors could access their accounts to transfer funds within the banking system. 
Wire transfers required Central Bank approval, foreign currency futures transactions were 
prohibited, and in effect, all investors, foreign and domestic, were prohibited from 
transferring funds abroad. Depositors could exchange dollars for government bonds, but 
few chose to do so. The restrictions were announced as temporary measures that would 
remain in place until the danger of the speculative attack had passed.
32 The scheduled 
program review by the IMF was not completed, and IMF support of Argentina was 
effectively withdrawn. (A detailed time line of the economic and political events between 




th, the ministers in President de la Rua’s cabinet resigned
33 and the 
following day the president himself resigned. Ramon Puerta assumed the presidency in 
the interim as Argentine country risk skyrocketed upwards (see Figure 5 where the EMBI 
spread for Argentina rises from 4000 in November to just under 10,000 at the end of 
December 2001).  A new interim president, Rodriguez Saa was named on December 23 - 
his term would last only a week before President Eduardo Duhalde assumed power on 
December 30. Foreign exchange trading was suspended on December 21 and was 
rescheduled to resume on January 10, 2002. 
 
In January the Argentine peso was officially devalued and all bank deposits and debts 
were “pesofied.” Dollar deposits were converted at 1.4 pesos to the dollar, while dollar 
                                                 
30 A literal translation of “Corralito” is little corral. It is also the word for “playpen.”  
31 Perhaps unsurprisingly there was a sudden increase in the number of new bank accounts in early 
December. The government promptly changed the regulations so that the deposit limits applied per person 
rather than per account. According to the press, some 500,000 accounts were opened in the two days 
following the imposition of bank restrictions. 
32 Some of the original withdrawal limits were eventually modified, though the main restrictions on capital 
outflow remained in place until December 2, 2002 (exactly one year after they were first introduced). See 
Appendix 1 for a detailed timeline of the changes in financial market regulations in Argentina beginning in 
October 2001. 
33 Including Domingo Cavallo, who had left the office in 1996 and returned to the position of Economic 
Minister with the de la Rua administration.  
  14loans were subject to one-to-one conversions, effectively imposing the bulk of the costs 
of pesofication on the banks rather than depositors.   The situation of the banks was made 
worse by the fact that they remained exposed to foreign exchange risk on foreign 
liabilities, which were not pesofied. Gutierrez and Montes-Negret (2004) estimate that 
the banking system had a negative net worth of at least $32b in January 2002. To 
“compensate” the banks the government issued new bonds called BODENs, which to 
date are illiquid (and their economic value is contingent on future debt restructuring and 
the governments’ fiscal sustainability). 
 
Given the political and economic chaos, the payments system ceased to function. Citizens 
took to the streets in protest of the economic conditions, and the foreign banks became a 
focus for their rage.  The number of reported bankruptcies by firms and individuals 
reached record proportions.  Growth in real GDP, consumption and investment turned 
sharply negative and the current account as a percent of GDP swung from –1.4 percent in 
2001 to 2.9 percent in 2002.  
 
Amidst the economic crisis, the Corralito triggered a 50 percent expansion of the stock 
market. One interpretation of the stock market run up in Argentina is that for some reason 
investors viewed the likely devaluation of the peso as beneficial for firms, whereas in 
other countries such crises are generally harmful. A more plausible explanation,   
however, is that the idiosyncratic reaction of the Argentine stock market was largely due 
to the specific restrictions in the Corralito that allowed investors to use their frozen bank 
deposits to purchase Argentine stocks,
34 and, in so doing, provided a legal mechanism for 
transferring funds abroad via ADRs.
35 
 
The loophole worked as follows. Under the Corralito, Argentine residents were allowed 
to use bank deposits in excess of the $1,000 monthly ceiling to purchase Argentine 
stocks. If a stock happened to be cross-listed in the U.S. those shares could be legally 
converted from Argentine shares into ADRs. The ADRs could then be sold in the United 
States and the dollar proceeds deposited in a U.S. account.
 36  Under normal 
circumstances the dollar proceeds would appear in the Argentine Balance of Payments as 
a capital inflow, as U.S. residents have acquired claims on Argentine firms.  Under the 
Corralito,  however, the capital inflows did not occur, and the dollars and/or shares 
remained outside of Argentina.  In effect, the ADR “loophole” allowed Argentines to 
transfer monies abroad, but the transactions did not result directly in a fall in Argentina’s 
international reserves (or a fall in Argentine bank deposits).  ADR conversions, however, 
                                                 
34 See Levy-Yeyati, Schmukler and van Horen (2003) for a further discussion of the stock market boom 
during the Corralito. 
35 ADRs are American Depositary Receipts. We will use the term ADR to mean shares of Argentine firms 
that are also cross-listed in the U.S. 
36 It is clear that the Argentine government understood the role ADRs might play in allowing citizens to 
transfer funds abroad.  However, because ADRs were associated with most of the largest publicly traded 
Argentine companies it would have been difficult for the government to disallow ADR transactions (and 
risk sending the Argentine stock market into a tail spin).  Also, the fact that ADR conversions did not have 
a direct impact on Central Bank reserves meant that the government was less concerned about this channel 
of capital outflow. 
  15did reduce the number of (underlying) shares available on the local stock exchange in 
Buenos Aires, La Bolsa. 
 
Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil and Tesar (2002) examine ADR premia for a number of 
Argentine securities. The evidence suggests that Argentine investors were willing to pay 
a substantial price to move their deposits out of Argentina through ADR conversions. At 
their peak, some ADRs were trading at a discount of in excess of 40 cents on the dollar. 
Figure 8 shows that a significant wedge appeared between the price of a portfolio of 
ADR stocks relative to non-ADR stocks beginning at the time of the Corralito. Figure 9 
shows a dramatic increase in the volume of trading in ADR securities, especially for 
Perez Companc which seemed to be the most popular security for ADR conversions. We  
estimate that ADR transactions resulted in a capital outflow of roughly $835 million to 




The Corralito, with its abrogation of individual and corporate property rights, resulted in 
a massive redistribution of wealth between depositors, lenders and financial institutions. 
Not surprisingly, the question of who owed what to whom became a matter for the courts 
and left the economy in a state of limbo. The courts issued a number of injunctions to 
savers who demanded that their dollar deposits be paid at the market exchange rate, 
rather than the rate decreed by the government of 1.4 pesos to the dollar, plus inflation.  
Honoring these injunctions cost the banks an extra 7 billion pesos.  The Supreme Court 
finally ruled in October 2004 that the pesofication of dollar deposits that took place in 
2001 was legal, relieving the banks of large potential losses from further injunctions.
37  
As a consequence of this recent history, most bank deposits in Argentina are short-term, 
which in turn limits the scope for banks to lend long-term.  In early 2004, credit to the 
private sector amounted to only 8% of GDP. 
 
In September 2003 Argentina again signed a three-year agreement with the IMF, which 
included a fiscal target of a primary surplus of 3% of GDP in the first year (coincidently 
exactly the number Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) calculated as needed in 1998 to 
regain sustainability).  In return the IMF agreed to lend Argentina $12.5b, the amount 
that was due to the IMF over the period 2003-2006.
38 In 2003, GDP grew 8.5 percent and 
inflation was 12.6 percent.
39  
 
                                                 
37 The Supreme Court approved the conversion of fixed-term savings in dollars to pesos -- known as 
”pesification” -- by five to one on October 26, 2004. The president of the Court, Enrique Petracchi, 
abstained from voting as his savings were caught in the freeze on bank accounts when the crisis broke out. 
38 The IMF’s lending to Argentina makes up roughly 15% of its total loans, giving Argentina quite a bit of 
leverage.  
39 See the Economist (2004) for further description of the current economic and political situation in 
Argentina. 
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  20Appendix: Argentina’s Financial Market Event Time Line 
 
1989   
July 9 
Carlos Menem assumed the Argentine presidency in the first peaceful 
transfer of power from one democratically elected leader to another 
since 1928. 
November 
New Foreign Investment Regime put into place.  All legal limits on 
foreign investment abolished.  Capital gains and dividends can now be 
repatriated freely.  No need for previous approval of transactions.  No 
legal limits regarding type or nature of foreign investment.  Introduction 
of a free exchange rate regime. Bekaert and Harvey official 
liberalization date.  
December 
The exchange system was again unified for all dealings under a Free 
Floating Rate and the currency unit depreciated. Dual export rates still 
exist. 
1990   
March  Currency made fully convertible. Market foreign portfolio investment 
by residents now possible. 
November  Menem extends value added tax to services, implements tax on fixed 
assets 
1991   
March 22  Export taxes are eliminated, abolishing the dual export rates. 
April 1 
Argentina’s Congress enacts the Convertibility Law, which legally 
adopts the currency board guaranteeing the convertibility of peso 
currency to dollars at a one-to-one fixed rate and limiting the printing of 
pesos only to an amount necessary to purchase dollars in the foreign 
exchange market. Effectively, each peso in circulation is backed by a 
U.S. dollar and monetary policy is forcibly constrained to uphold that 
promise. 
 
August   Law protecting dollar denominated deposits enacted. 
October 
Argentine Fund begins. This fund marks the first time US investors can 
invest in a mutual fund that represents a broad part of the market. 
Deregulation decree reformed domestic industry, external trade, and 
capital markets. The deregulation decree eliminates capital gains taxes 
for foreigners. 
1992  Argentina enjoys strong economic growth and the currency board is 
considered highly successful. 
January  Austral replaced by peso. All transactions in currency can now be made 
on the free market at free negotiated rates. 
July  Moody's upgrades Argentina's sovereign debt rating from B3 to B1. 
1993 
The economy soars, at an annual growth rate above 5.5 percent, as 
inflation subsides and the government embarks on an ambitious program 
of deregulation, lowering trade barriers and privatizing state-owned 
enterprises including oil, telephones and power. 
March  Social security reform (announcement of creation of private pension 
  21fund system to begin operation in future). Argentina's Comission de 
Valores stipulates that only financial intermediary firms belonging to 
self-regulating organizations can participate in public offering of 
securities. This move attempts to cut down on insider trading on the 
Buenos Aires exchange. 
April 7 
Swaps of bonds for eligible debts agreed to under the Brady Plan by 
Argentina and foreign creditor banks began to take place in accordance 
with the debt- and debt-service-reduction operations. 
May  Import tariffs on capital goods abolished and a 15% tax reimbursement 
to capital goods producers established. 
August   S&P assigns first time rating of BB- to sovereign debt. 
1994   
March 28  Swaps of bonds for eligible debts agreed to under the Brady Plan by 
Argentina and foreign creditor banks are completed. 
August   First T-bill auction in 20 years held. 
December 20 
Mexican peso devaluation was followed by a withdrawal of foreign 
investors from Latin American countries, leading to banking crises: 
eight banks were suspended and three banks collapsed. Events 
weakened position of wholesale banks that had significant inventories of 
government securities on which they were incurring capital losses due to 
the increase in interest rates. Non-financial firms were affected as well. 
Central Bank provided emergency liquidity assistance. 
December 28  Reserve requirements reduced on dollar deposits in order to provide 
more liquidity to the banking system. 
1995  Following Mexico’s December 1994 peso devaluation, capital flows out 
of emerging markets. Argentina’s GDP declines by 2.8%.  
January 1  The Treaty of Asuncion (1991), establishing the Southern Core 
Common Market (MERCOSUR) became effective. 
January 15 
Reserve requirements on peso deposits lowered and a special security 
fund managed by Banco Nacion set up to assist institutions which 
suffered high deposit withdrawals. 
February  Trust Fund for Provincial Development set up to help support Provincial 
Banks. 
March  
The statistical tax of 3 percent was reimposed on all imports, with the 
exception of capital goods, fuel, and goods produced in the paper, 
computer, and telecommunications sectors. All goods imported from the 
member countries of MERCOSUR were also exempted. Trust Fund for 
Bank Capitalization established and changes made to the Central Bank 
charter to allow it to use repos and rediscounts to help troubled banks. 
New loan agreements made with the IMF, World Bank and IBD and 
issuance of new bonds to increase international reserves and fund the 
trust funds. 
April 
A limited system of deposit insurance was introduced in response to the 
banking crisis. Provincial sales tax considered in exchange for lower 
social security contributions.  
May    New rules for bank reserve requirements implemented. President 
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electoral laws that prohibit a second term. 
August 
Bank reserve requirement for checking and savings accounts lowered 
from 33% to 30% and the 2% reserve requirement for time deposits is 
eliminated. 
1996 
The central bank announced the creation of a $6 billion emergency fund 
to strengthen the banking sector. Labor reform allows companies to 
reduce payroll expenses by firing workers without severance pay. 
July 26  Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo is dismissed. 
August  Tax increases on fuel and public transportation. Government announces 
plans to increase personal asset tax on holdings over $100,000 to 1%. 
September Economic  hardship  leads to a general strike.  
1997  Removal of most entry barriers and branching restrictions of the banking 
sector. 
April  Standard and Poor's raises sovereign debt rating to BB and upgrades 13 
private companies to investment grade. 
July  East Asian financial crisis begins. 
1998  Argentina enters prolonged recession in third quarter and unemployment 
begins to rise. 
February 
The IMF approved a three-year $2.8 billion line of credit to support 
Argentina's economic reform program. The major tax package would 
reduce by 50% the VAT tax on basic consumer goods. The top 
corporate tax rate would boost to 35% from 33% and reduce by 10% the 
social security contributions by employers.  
August  Russia announces a partial default on its sovereign bonds. 
1999   
January 13  Brazil devalues its currency. 
September 
The Argentine Congress passes the Fiscal Responsibility Law, 
committing to large reductions in both federal and provincial 
government spending. 
October 24 
Fernando de la Rua of the Radical Civic Union (UCR), the opposition 
coalition candidate, running on a platform to end corruption (under 
Menem) and the recession, defeats Peronist candidate Eduardo Duhalde 
for President. De la Rua inherits 114 billion-dollar public debt. 
December 10  De la Rua is inaugurated President of Argentina and shortly thereafter 
seeks assistance from the IMF. 
2000 
Strikes and fuel tax protests. Beef exports slump after an outbreak of 
foot-and-mouth disease. Soya exports suffer from concerns over the use 
of genetically modified varieties.  
March 10 
The IMF agrees to three-year $7.2 billion stand-by arrangement with 
Argentina conditioned on a strict fiscal adjustment and the assumption 
of 3.5% GDP growth in 2000 (actual growth was 0.5%). 
May 29 
The government announces $1 billion in budget cuts in hopes that fiscal 
responsibility will bring renewed confidence to economy. 
 
December 18  The de la Rua government announces a $40 billion multilateral 
  23assistance package organized by IMF. 
2001   
January 12 
Argentina’s continued poor economic performance prompts the IMF to 
augment the March 10, 2000 agreement by $7.0 billion as part of a $40 
billion assistance package involving the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the World Bank, Spain, and private lenders. The agreement 
assumes GDP will grow at a rate of 2.5% in 2001 (versus actual decline 
of 5.0%). 
March 19 
Domingo Cavallo, Minister of Economy under Menem and architect of 
the currency board ten years earlier, replaces Ricardo Lopez Murphy, 
who resigns as Minister of Economy. 
March 26-28  Risk rating agencies lower Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating (S&P 
from BB to B+ and Moody’s from B1 to B2). 
March 28 
Minister Cavallo secures “emergency powers” from Congress. Cavallo 
announces economic program comprising a tax on bank transactions, 
changes in other taxes and tariffs, and sectoral “competitiveness plans.” 
April  Central bank reduces liquidity requirements and allows banks to include 
government securities up to Arg$2 billion among liquidity requirements. 
May 8  Standard & Poor’s lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating 
further from B+ to B. 
June 3 
Authorities announce the completion of the “mega-swap.” Government 
bonds with a face value of US$29.5 billion are voluntarily exchanged 
for longer-term instruments. 
June 15 
Minister Cavallo announces package of tax and trade measures, 
including a trade compensation mechanism for exporters and importers 
of non-energy goods. 
June 16-17 
The de la Rua government announces a $29.5 billion voluntary debt 
restructuring in which short-term debt is exchanged for new debt with 
longer maturities and higher interest rates. 
June 19 
The peso exchange rate for merchandise trade is priced at a 50/50 dollar-
euro peg, effectively allowing a 7% devaluation for foreign trade in 
hopes of improving Argentina’s international competitiveness. Many 
analysts raise concern over the effects on the credibility of the 
convertibility regime. 
July 
Much of the country is brought to a standstill by a general strike in 
protest against proposed government spending cuts. Risk rating agencies 
lower Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating further (S&P from B to B- 
and Moody’s first from B2 to B3 and then from B3 to Caa1). 
July 10  Government pays yield of 14.1 percent to place US$827 million of 90-
day 8 paper. 
July 11 
Minister Cavallo announces drastic program of fiscal adjustment aimed 
at eliminating the federal government deficit from August 2001 onwards 
(the “zero-deficit plan”). 
July 30  Senate approves the zero-deficit plan (lower house of Congress had 
approved it on July 20). 
August 21  IMF announces likely US$8 billion augmentation of Argentina’s stand-
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September 7  IMF approves augmentation of stand-by credit to about US$21.6 billion 
and completes Fourth Review. 
September 20 
The Central Bank activates the contingent repo facility with 
international banks, boosting gross reserves by about US$1.2 billion 
(US$500 million was disbursed in October). 
October 9-12  Risk rating agencies lower Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating 
further (S&Pfrom B- to CCC and Moody’s from Caa1 to Caa3). 
October 12  Moody’s lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating from Caa1 to 
Caa3. 
October 16 
Pre-set date for Congressional elections. The opposition Peronists take 
control of both houses of Parliament. Cavallo and financial markets 
(erroneously) expected that a fiscal deal could be worked out after the 
elections (on the 17
th). 
October 28 
Minister Cavallo starts negotiations with the IMF and the U.S. Treasury 
to purchase collateral for new Argentine bonds to be issued in an 
exchange for the nearly $100 billion of local and external debt. 
October 29 
Mr. Cavallo defines the debt exchange operation as voluntary. The old 
debt would exchange for bonds paying seven percent per year and be 
guaranteed by tax revenues. The IMF and U.S. Treasury require 
compliance with a zero deficit and an agreement with the provinces on 
tax revenue sharing before any kind of financial support is given. 
October 30  Standard & Poor’s lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating from 
CCC+ to CC. 
November 1 
The authorities announce a new fiscal package, including a new batch of 
competitiveness plans, the rebate of VAT payments on debit card 
transactions, a temporary reduction in employee social security 
contributions, a corporate debt restructuring scheme, and a tax amnesty 
that writes off interest and penalty obligations accrued to end-September 
2001. 
November 6 
Standard & Poor’s lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating from 
CC to SD (selective default). Argentina conducts a second debt swap, 
exchanging $60 billion of bonds with an average interest rate of 11-12% 
for extended maturity notes carrying only 7% interest rate. International 
bond rating agencies consider it an effective default. 
November 19 
The IMF announces it will not make any new disbursements without 
being satisfied that Argentina has secured the goals previously 
designated. 
November 23 
The Central Bank introduces an effective cap on bank deposits, by 
imposing a 100 percent liquidity requirement on deposits paying an 
interest rate more than 1 percentage point above average of all local 
banks. 
November 30 
End of a debt swap with local banks and pension funds for more that 55 
billion (over a total public debt of 160 billions). The authorities 
announce completion of the local-leg of the debt restructuring. 
Government bonds with a face value of US$41 billion at the Federal 
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exchanged. 
December  Economy Minister Cavallo announces sweeping restrictions to halt an 
exodus of bank deposits. The IMF stops $1.3bn in aid.  
December 2 
The government announces temporary capital control regime (termed 
Corralito) involving bank withdrawal limits and limits on dollar 
transfers abroad as a last-ditch effort to fend off a devaluation and 
prevent a major banking crisis. Withdrawals are limited to 250 pesos 
(dollars) per week per account. Depositors, however, may still access 
funds for larger purchases through checks or debit cards and transfer 
their money among banks. Holders of deposits may also exchange them 
for federal bonds (BODENs) maturing in 2005, 2007 or 2012 in a Canje 
exchange. No limits are placed on domestic payments made with 
checks, credits, debit cards and electronic MEP (Metodo Electronico de 
Pagos) payments. 
December 3 
The capital control measures announced on Dec 2nd come into full 
effect through Decree 1570-01 on Dec 3
rd: 
a) Wire transfers suspended except with prior Central Bank approval. 
b) Cash withdrawals from the Banking System limited to US$ 1000 per 
month. 
c) Financial Argentine institutions prohibited from foreign currency 
futures transactions. 
d) Financial Argentine institutions prohibited from issuing new bank 
loans denominated in Argentine Pesos. All new loans must be issued in 
U.S. dollars and existing peso loans must be converted to U.S. dollar 
loans at a one to one rate. 
e) Foreign investors trading in the Argentine Securities Market subject 
to repatriation restrictions. Funds related to securities transactions must 
remain in the country until government approval is obtained or the 
measure is officially revoked. 
December 5  The IMF withholds $1.24 billion loan installment, citing Argentina’s 
repeated inability to meet fiscal targets. 
December 7  Argentina announces it can no longer guarantee payment on foreign 
debt. 
December 10 
The BCRA imposes a 98 percent reserve requirement on deposit 
increases after December 1, 2001; aimed at limiting flight to quality 
within the system. 
December 13 
A 24-hour general strike is held in protest at curbs on bank withdrawals, 
delayed pension payouts and other measures. Phase one of the 
government debt exchange is completed. 
December 19 
State of emergency is declared to stop protests against Minister 
Cavallo’s economic policies. The lower house of Congress repeals the 
special legislative powers granted to Cavallo. 
December 20 
President Dela Rua and Minister Cavallo resign after days of riots and 
protests that leave over 20 demonstrators dead. A banking holiday is 
declared for December 21, extended through December 26. Moody’s 
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interim president. Country Risk reaches 4618 points. Global (sovereign) 
bond yields reach their historical maximum of 49% annual return in 
dollars. 
December 21  The official Foreign Exchange Rate market is closed. 
December 23 
Mr. Rodriguez Saa becomes the new interim president for 60 days. He 
declares the suspension of external debt payments for at least 60 days, 
totaling $166bn in federal and provincial debt. 
December 24  The government announces that a new fiat currency (i.e., without 
foreign-currency backing) will be created (the argentino). 
December 26 
The liquidity standards for banks are relaxed. Rodriguez Saa announces 
a new economic plan based on: 1) suspension of payments on public 
debt; 2) new jobs creation program; and 3) creation of new currency (the 
Argentino) to begin circulating in January 2002 and not to be 
convertible to the U.S. dollar. 
December 30  President Saá resigns after his emergency policies are rejected by the 
Peronist governors. 
2002   
January 1  Congress elects Peronist Senator Eduardo Duhalde as caretaker 
president.  
January 3 
Senator Duhalde is sworn-in as President with a mandate to conclude 
the remaining period of the de la Rúa presidency; President Duhalde 
announces the end of convertibility, and the introduction of a dual 
foreign exchange regime. 
January 4  “Leak” reported in the financial press suggests that a 40% devaluation is 
imminent. 
January 5  The Argentine stock market is closed. 
January 6 
The Argentine Congress votes to establish the Law of Economic 
Emergency and abolish the Convertibility Law.  After the Argentine 
Congress passes necessary legislation, President Duhalde announces the 
end of the currency board and a plan to devalue the peso by 29% (to 1.4 
to the dollar) for major foreign commercial transactions, with a floating 
rate for all other transactions. Other elements of economic plan include: 
converting all debts up to $100,000 to pesos (passing on devaluation 
cost to creditors); capital and bank account controls; a new tax on oil to 
compensate creditors for the losses that will ensue; renegotiating public 
debt, and a balanced budget. 
January 7 
The new Minister of Finance, Mr. Lenicov, announces the devaluation 
of the peso and the establishment of a new dual foreign exchange rate 
regime, to be implemented on the 9
th of January, 2002. 
January 10 
Government announces it will “guarantee” dollar deposits, but to curtail 
bank runs, the $1,000 (1,500 peso) limit on monthly withdrawals is 
maintained and all checking and savings accounts with balances 
exceeding $10,000 and $3,000, respectively, will be converted to 
certificates of deposit and remain frozen for at least one year. Smaller 
deposits have the option of earlier withdrawal by moving to peso 
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January 11 
After several delays, the exchange rate market re-opens and the new 
dual exchange rate system is put in place: 
a)  1 Argentinean peso= 1 U.S. dollar parity (Convertibility Plan) is 
abolished.  
b) All debts (capital and interests) agreed in ARG currency with 
financial entities - converted into U.S. dollars according to the Decree 
1570/2001- will be reconverted into the original currency agreed 
(pesos). 
c) The official, fixed conversion rate of 1 U.S Dollar=1.4 pesos is 
relevant for foreign trade operations. The free or floating rate is relevant 
for all other transactions and freely determined by the market. 
 
January 16  The IMF approves request for one-year extension on $936 million 
payment due January 17, keeping Argentina from falling into arrears. 
January 17 
Argentine stock market re-opens.  The government announces that 
dollar denominated loans exceeding $100,000 will be converted to pesos 
at 1.4 for fixed rate, deepening the balance sheet mismatch of banks. 
January 19-20  Duhalde reverses his decision to guarantee dollar deposits, which will be 
converted to pesos at some undefined devalued exchange rate. 
January 21 
The government announces the easing of bank withdrawal restrictions: 
a) Up to 7,000 pesos can be withdrawn from term deposits in pesos 
(transferring that money to a checking account) 
b) Up to 5,000 dollars can be withdrawn from term deposits in dollars 
(transferring that money to a checking account at the official exchange 
rate, 1.40). 
c) Up to 5,000 dollars in a saving account can be pesofied at the official 
exchange rate. 
January 23 
The Argentine Senate passes bankruptcy law that would use capital 
controls to restrict payment of foreign private debt payments through 
December 2003. 
January 24  Utility tariffs are frozen indefinitely. 
January 30 
Argentina’s Chamber of Deputies passes controversial bankruptcy law, 
stripping it of the Senate provision prohibiting foreign debt payments, 
but other capital controls remain in effect. It retains language allowing 
conversion of dollar denominated debt below $100,000 to pesos at 1-to-
1 rate (benefitting debtors) and suspending creditor action on loan debt 
defaults for 180 days. 
February 3 
Mr. Lenicov announces an asymmetric pesofication and the end of the 
dual exchange rate regime: 
a) pesofication of all dollar deposits at 1.4 pesos per dollar.  
b) corporate and consumer debts are also pesofied, but at the exchange 
rate prevailing during the Convertibility period. Both deposits and credit 
will be indexed to inflation.  
c) the end of the dual exchange rate regime and a unified floating 
exchange rate determined by market forces. 
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without any amount restrictions (before workers could only extract up to 
1.500 pesos). 
Corralon starts which freezes bank term deposits (holders of  term 
deposits had the option to convert them into CEDROs or BODENs 
maturing in 2007 or 2012 in a Canje exchange). 
February 4 
The government decrees the unification of the exchange rate regime and 
the asymmetric pesoization of bank balance sheets (assets at 
Arg$1/US$1, and liabilities at Arg$1.4/US$1). The official foreign 
exchange market is closed. 
February 11 
The BCRA establishes a new unified free foreign exchange market, 
which replaces the two markets - official and free - implemented in 
January. The exchange rate market re-opens and the floating dollar 
exchange rate reaches 2.1 pesos, well below the devaluation 
expectations built-into asset prices. 
February 27 
The federal government and the provincial governors reach agreement 
on a temporary revenue sharing arrangement that abolishes the 
minimum floor on transfers to the provinces in exchange for: (i) the 
broadening of the coparticipation base to include the financial 
transactions tax; and (ii) better terms for their debt servicing. The 
provinces commit to reduce fiscal deficits by 60 percent in 2002 and to 
achieve balance in 2003. 
March 5  Export taxes of 10 percent and 5 percent are imposed on primary 
products and process agricultural and industrial products, respectively. 
March 8  The pesoization of government debt under Argentine law is decreed. 
March 13 
A voluntary bond swap (Swap I) is decreed authorizing the exchange of 
reprogrammed time deposits for government bonds. The decree also 
authorized issuance of bonds to banks in compensation for the 
asymmetric pesoization of their balance sheets. 
March 25 
The peso reaches a peak of Arg$4 per dollar. To contain the 
depreciation of the currency, the authorities intervene heavily in the 
foreign exchange market (US$800 million in March), tighten the access 
to central bank liquidity assistance (a matching dollar from the parent 
being now requested as a condition for assistance to foreign banks), and 
introduce a variety of exchange regulations affecting banks, foreign 
exchange bureaus, and exporters. Thirteen new regulations are issued on 
March 25 alone, bringing the total for the month of March to about 50. 
March 26 
The Central Bank announces new measures related to foreign exchange 
transactions and ADR/CEDEAR conversions aimed at improving the 
functioning of the foreign currency market and regulating the buying 
and selling of foreign currency by order and for the account of the 
Central Bank. The press communication also mentions that there will be 
coordination between the Comision Nacional de Valores (CNV)  and the 
Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA) in order to adopt new 
measures to regulate capital outflows via ADR and CEDEAR 
transactions. 
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financial system could collapse.  
April 9  Export taxes on agricultural primary products were increased to 20–23½ 
percent. 
April 19 
The central bank suspends for 30 days Scotiabank Quilmes. A bank 
holiday is declared until Congress approves a solution to the problem of 
judicial injunctions (amparos) releasing bank deposits. The authorities 
begin working on a plan (the so-called BONEX II plan) to convert 
reprogrammed time deposits into government bonds. 
April 20  Economy Minister Remes Lenicov presents to congress the BONEX II 
plan; the draft law is rejected and Minister Remes resigns. 
April 23  President Duhalde reaches agreement with provincial governors on a 14-
point Federal-Provincial Pact. 
April 25 
Congress approves the Ley Tapón to ease pressure from the amparos. 
The law modifies court procedures, and states that depositors can only 
access funds once the judicial process is over; in the meantime funds are 
deposited in an escrow account. 
May 6  The Federal Congress approves the February Federal-Provincial Pact. 
May 15 
Congress approves law that reverses the most harmful provisions of the 
January emergency law and makes limited improvements to the 
insolvency law. 
May 30  The Economic Subversion Law is repealed. 
May 31 
In order to tighten the control over the sale of export receipts, the central 
bank announced that dollar export revenues in excess of US$1 million 
will have be sold directly to the central bank. Province of Buenos Aires 
and Federal government sign full-fledged text of Bilateral Agreement. 
Agreement on the Annexes (quarterly fiscal targets and calendar for 
disbursement) is reached in June. 
June 1 
President Duhalde signs the Options Plan on reprogrammed deposits, a 
revised version offormer Minister Remes’ BONEX II Plan, giving 
depositors the option to exchange deposits into bonds. 
June 18  The minimum level of export proceeds that should be surrendered to the 
central bank lowered from US$1 million to US$500,000. 
July 
Duhalde calls early elections for March 2003, later put back to April, to 
try win public support for the government's handling of the economic 
crisis. 
July 9 
In response to a class action suit lodged by the country’s ombudsman on 
behalf of all depositors, a federal court declared the deposit freeze and 
pesoization unconstitutional. 
July 24  The government issued a decree suspending court ordered withdrawals 
of frozen bank deposits for 120 business days. 
July 25  The decree suspending deposit withdrawals obtained through court 
orders is declared partially unconstitutional by a federal judge. 
July 26 
Following a demand by the national ombudsman a judge rules 
unconstitutional the government decree suspending lawsuits on 
December's bank curbs for 120 business days. 
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A panel of monetary policy experts made public several proposals to 
resolve the country’s financial crisis including a monetary policy 
anchor, an independent central bank, the ending of peso printing deficit-
financing, and an end to the use of quasi-currencies by the provinces. 
The report calls for a floating exchange rate and urges Argentina to stop 
using international reserves to support the peso. 
August 15 
Congress approves a bill extending for 90 days (through mid-November 
2002) the provision that suspends certain kinds of creditor-initiated 
nonbankruptcy law enforcement actions. Congress also approves a bill 
extending for 60 days (through end-September 2002) the application of 
price indexation to loans. 
August 22 
The Supreme Court declares unconstitutional the 13 percent salary cut 
for federal government workers and pensioners, implemented from July 
2001. 
August 26  The government issues a resolution to allow the issuance of bank-
compensation bonds for the asymmetric pesoization. 
August 28  A federal court establishes that parent banks should be fully responsible 
for the liabilities of subsidiaries in Argentina. 
September 
The central bank passed a very restrictive regulation (circular #3723) 
that mandated that every stock be traded in its underlying currency.  
After intense opposition from the financial community, the central bank 
rescinded #3723 and instead passed a resolution (circular #3727) that 
forbids “contra cable” operations.  These operations allowed brokers to 
sell stocks purchased in Buenos Aires instantaneously in New York (or 
any foreign market) using the Mercado de Valores as a clearinghouse.  
Under #3727 it was still possible for investors in Argentina to convert 
CEDEARs and sell them in New York, but this new restriction 
significantly increased the transactions costs to do so.   
September 3 
The government introduces new exchange controls in an attempt to 
boost international reserves and defend the peso: (i) the limit for 
exporters’ foreign exchange surrender to the central bank is reduced 
from US$500,000 to US$200,000; (ii) the minimum maturity of external 
debt contracted by private nonfinancial entities is set to 90 days; (3) 
exchange bureaus are required to deposit with the central bank foreign 
exchange holdings exceeding US$1.5 million on a daily basis; and (4) 
the net dollar positions held by exchange dealers operating on behalf of 
the central bank are reduced by an average 40 percent. 
September 5 
The federal administrative dispute chamber, an appellate court, rules 
that the decrees establishing the corralito and pesoization, were 
unconstitutional. The ruling applies to only one case, but opens the door 
for further similar rulings. 
September 9 
Further tightening of foreign exchange controls: prior authorization from 
the central bank for dollar purchases exceeding US$100,000 for 
portfolio and other financial investments abroad, as well as for the 
purchase of foreign banknotes. 
September 13  The Federal Court of Appeals declared the corralito, pesoization, and the 
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unconstitutional; the decision allows depositors to claim their deposits in 
court immediately. The 2003 budget was submitted to Congress. 
September 17 
The government issued a decree that extends the negotiation period for 
utility tariffs for another 120 days with the possibility of a further 60 
days extension. 
September 20 
The government launched a second swap of bonds for frozen deposits 
and announced the easing of restrictions on frozen time-deposits of up to 
Arg$7,000. 
October 31  The monthly cash withdrawal limit on the corralito raised to Arg$2,000 
from Arg$1,200. 
November 
Argentina defaults on an $800m debt repayment to the World Bank, 
having failed to re-secure IMF aid. The World Bank says it will not 
consider new loans for the country.  
November 11  After discussions with the government, the banks announced a voluntary 
75 day stay on foreclosures. 
November 14 
The government did not fully meet an $809 million World Bank debt 
payment; only $79.2 million in interest was paid. President Duhalde 
signed a decree lowering the VAT rate by 2 percentage point 
November 15  A lower court suspended the public hearings designed to grant a tariff 
increase to the privatized utility companies. 
November 18 
President Duhalde signed a 12-point agreement with provincial 
governors and some key legislators over the new election timetable and 
the government's economic policies. 
November 21 
The Senate approved President Eduardo Duhalde's plans for delaying 
the presidential election by a month to April. The first round of 
presidential elections is scheduled to be held on April 27, 2003 and will 
be followed by a second round on May 10, if necessary. 
November 22 
The government announced that it will lift the remaining corralito 
restrictions on sight accounts effective December 2. Term deposits (the 
corralón) remain frozen. Minister Lavagna submitted a draft decree to 
President Duhalde lifting the tariff rates on electricity and natural gas. 
On average, electricity rates will rise 9.0 percent and natural gas 7.2 
percent. 
November 27  Executive decree issued authorizing court imposed stay on foreclosures 
for 30 business days, during which time mediation is required. 
December 2  Corralito rescinded. 
December 9  The resignation of Central Bank President Pignanelli is accepted by 
President Duhalde. 
December 10 
President Duhalde appointed Mr. Alfonso Prat Gay to be central bank 
president. Legislation eliminating the ability of the executive to grant 
tax amnesties becomes effective. 
December 11  A court order reverses the decreed increases in electricity and gas tariffs. 
2003   
March 9  The Supreme Court ruled that conversion to pesos was illegal. 
According to the Central Bank, approximately to 8,760 million US 
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dollars are at stake. 
May 
Nestor Kirchner sworn in as president. Former President Carlos Menem 
gained most votes in first round of elections but pulled out before 
second round.  
September 10 
Argentine finance officials reached an agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for a three-year, US$ 12.6 billion stand-by credit. 
Under the terms of the new arrangement, the government pledges to 
raise the consolidated primary fiscal surplus from 2.5% of GDP this year 
to 3.0% next year. 
2004   
April 9 
Argentina decided to make a $3.1 billion payment to the IMF, a retreat 
from a vow by Buenos Aires that it would not pay up unless the IMF 
sends signals it would approve an upcoming report on Argentina 's 
economic progress as part of the 2003 accord. 
July 2 
Argentina filed a shelf registration statement with the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, completing the documentation needed to 
seek regulatory approval in the U.S. for a debt exchange to restructure 
some $100 billion in defaulted debt. 
October 26 
The Supreme Court ruled that the conversion of fixed-term savings in 
dollars to pesos – known as “pesofication” – was legal, relieving the 
banks of large potential losses from further injunctions. 
 
Sources: Ambito Financiero, La Nacion, Clarin, Pictet, IMF (2003) , BBC News, de la 





 Table 1: Economic Performance, 1990-2002
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1985-90 1991-94 1995-98 1999-02
National income accounts and Macroeconomic Indicators 1/
Real GDP 100.0 108.9 118.3 125.5 133.8 129.0 136.1 147.2 152.9 147.7 146.5 140.1 124.8 103.3 121.6 141.3 139.8
GDP growth (%)  0.1 8.5 8.3 5.9 6.4 -3.6 5.4 7.8 3.8 -3.4 -0.8 -4.5 -11.5 0.2 5.3 4.3 -4.1
Consumption growth (%) 0.8 14.4 10.6 -14.9 6.7 -4.9 5.3 9.0 3.4 -1.9 -2.0 -5.1 -22.3 0.4 0.6 4.5 -7.1
Investment growth (%) -12.1 14.5 22.3 18.8 10.2 -13.5 6.2 14.7 6.7 -13.6 -11.5 -17.8 -28.5 -4.0 13.7 7.1 -13.5
Export growth (%) -23.5 -19.6 -6.3 9.3 14.2 22.0 12.9 9.0 2.4 -9.4 9.8 1.2 76.1 -2.2 4.4 6.3 24.3
Import growth (%) -36.9 37.9 39.6 17.1 18.6 -8.0 14.8 22.1 5.0 -14.9 -0.9 -16.6 11.1 -5.2 20.7 11.0 -1.6
Investment (% GDP) 14.0 14.6 16.7 19.1 19.9 17.9 18.1 19.4 19.9 18.0 16.2 14.2 12.0 17.0 17.6 18.8 15.1
Current account (% GDP) 2.3 -0.9 -3.1 -3.3 -4.1 -2.0 -2.5 -4.2 -4.9 -4.2 -3.2 -1.4 2.9 -1.4 -2.9 -3.4 -1.5
Unemployment rate 11/  9.2 6 7 9 12 16 16.56 13.41 12.1 13.48 14.65 18.06 17.5
Inflation, interest rates, and financial markets
CPI inflation 1/ 318.4 99.9 22.2 10.1 4.1 3.3 0.2 0.5 0.9 -1.2 -0.9 -1.1 23.0 396.3 9.5 0.4 5.4
M3 growth (%) 2/ … … … … … -4.4 18.2 23.8 9.8 2.3 4.3 -25.6 … … … 13.0 -7.1
Average EMBI+ index 3/ … … … 100.0 88.6 82.9 112.1 140.9 148.4 155.2 175.3 153.7 57.4 … 94.3 121.1 135.4
International Reserves (ARP mil.) 4/ … … … … 17,938 16,749 17,738 18,463 19,775 19,151 18,775 19,792 35,231 … 17,938 18,181 23,237
Real Effective Exchange Rate 5/ 100.0 35.6 39.5 76.3 103.1 105.1 112.4 122.5 133.1 148.5 167.0 129.6 44.8 … 63.6 118.3 122.5
Merval Index 6/ 316.9 798.2 427.4 582.8 460.0 519.0 649.0 687.0 429.0 550.0 417.0 295.0 155.0 … 567.1 571.0 354.3
Peso (prime) loan rate 1/ … … … … 10.1 17.8 10.5 9.2 10.6 11.0 11.1 27.7 51.7 … … 12.1 25.4
Spread between peso and USD interest rates (basis … 6,564.7 1,158.6 328.5 345.3 362.6 93.0 117.3 145.9 202.4 191.1 2,101.1 3,968.4 … 2,099.3 179.7 1,615.8
JP Morgan Sovereign Bond Spread (basis points) 3 … … … … … … … 456.0 596.9 720.4 667.9 1,481.7 5,795.1 … … 526.4 2,166.3
Fiscal measures
Government deficit (% GDP) 1/ -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 -2.9 -2.4 -3.3 -1.1 -2.1 -0.5 -1.3 -2.4
Provincial government deficits (% GDP) 7/ -9.4 -10.2 -11.5 -12.5 -12.4 -12.7 -11.9 -11.8 -12.4 -13.7 -13.5 -14.5 -11.6 -9.4 -11.6 -12.2 -13.3
Public debt (% GDP) 2/ … … … 28.2 29.9 33.8 35.7 34.5 37.6 43.0 45.0 53.8 43.9 … … 35.4 46.4
External debt (USD mil.) 8/ 62,233 65,406 68,345 64,718 75,139 98,802 111,380 128,410 141,550 145,290 145,880 136,710 … 58,030 68,402 120,036 142,627
Debt (% exports) 8/ 373.7 405.4 385.3 341.1 327.9 336.0 338.9 352.2 379.4 426.6 377.6 373.7 … 535.9 365.0 351.6 392.7
Privatization revenue (ARP mil.) 9/ … … … 523.3 732.9 1,171.2 374.9 21.5 96.3 2,579.1 144.7 60.2 4.5 … … 416.0 697.1
IMF loans (USD mil.) 1/ -257.3 -589.8 -73.0 1,211.2 455.3 1,924.1 367.3 -37.6 -654.3 -826.5 773.1 9,334.9 -739.3 173.7 250.9 399.9 2,135.6
Banking sector figures 10/
Lending to private sector/GDP (%) … … … … 17.5 18.1 18.8 20.5 22.4 23.0 21.8 18.7 … … … 20.0 21.2
Lending to public sector/GDP (%) … … … … 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 4.2 5.3 8.1 … … … 2.5 5.9
ARP deposits/GDP (%) … … … … 8.0 7.4 9.0 10.9 11.7 11.5 11.3 7.0 19.1 … … 9.7 12.2
USD deposits/GDP (%) … … … … 8.7 9.1 10.4 12.5 14.0 16.2 18.3 17.4 0.3 … … 11.5 13.0
1/ Sources: Della Paolera and Taylor (2003); International Financial Statistics (2004); and authors' calculations.
2/ Sources: Ministry of Economy and Production. Average M3 growth for 1999-02 are through 2001 only.
3/ Source: Data Resources International. Average EMBI+ figures for 1991-94 includes data from 1993-94 only. Sovereign bond spread for 1995-98 includes data from 1997-98 only.
4/ Source: Central Bank of Argentina. Figures for 1991-94 are from 1994 only.
5/ Source: Dubas, Lee and Nelson (2004).  An increase indicates a peso appreciation.
6/ Source: Ministry of Economy and Production. Index is in US dollars. Year end figures.
7/ Source: Ministry of Economy and Production. 1997-2002 data are provisional.
8/ Source: Global Development Finance. Average for 1999-02 includes data through 2001 only.
9/ Sources: Secretariat of Treasury and Ministry of Economy and Production.
10/ Source: Central Bank of Argentina. Year end figures.
11/ Source: IMF international Financial Statistics
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Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund  
 
 
























Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thompson’s International Mergers and Acquisitions database 
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US net purchases of Latin Am
bonds and equity
of which Argentina
Russian default Mexican crisis
Asia crisis Brazil devaluation
Source: Treasury International Capital (TIC) system, US Treasury Department
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Source: Data resources international. 
Corralito
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Note that the acquisition of YPF 
by Repsol (Spain) accounts for 
$15.1 billion of all foreign 
acquisitions in 1999 (63% of 
FDI inflow)
FDI inflow Acquisitions by foreign
residents
Source:  FDI data from Global Development Finance, World Bank. Mergers and acquisitions data from SDC Thompson's
International Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
 




























Source: Dubas, Lee and Nelson (2004), an increase indicates a peso appreciation relative to a trade-weighted basket of currencies
 





























































































Source: Bolsar  
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